Max B. Norton

This paper examines how increased local fiscal discretion affects the distribution of public goods and household sorting. I study California's 2001 reform that reduced the approval threshold for local school bonds from two-thirds to 55 percent of votes cast. Using the reform as a natural experiment, I show that affected districts increased their capital spending by 60 percent compared to the previous decade, equivalent to three additional years of typical capital investment. The fiscal response is concentrated in districts with high income heterogeneity, leading to greater inequality in school facilities between districts. Despite this between-district divergence, within affected districts the reform increased income heterogeneity, particularly among families with children. These districts experienced a 10 percent increase in low-income families and greater income heterogeneity among households with children, while showing minimal effects on other household types. The main beneficiaries of the increased spending are low-income families with children who gain access to improved facilities, particularly in relatively affluent districts. These findings have direct implications for proposed school district and local government borrowing policies in several states.

Numerous countries cut payroll taxes in response to COVID-19, including China, which reduced employer contributions by up to 21 percentage points. We use administrative data on more than 800,000 Chinese firms to evaluate payroll tax cuts as a business relief measure. We estimate that the tax cuts cover 31.5% of the decline in business cash flow, but labor informality causes 53% of registered firms-24% of aggregate economic activity-to receive no benefits at all. We quantify the targeting of the policy in terms of how much benefits flow to small firms less able to access external finance and to sectors worse hit by COVID-19. We find that (1) small firms and vulnerable industries are comparatively more labor intensive, which leads to desirable targeting; (2) labor informality worsens, but does not eliminate, targeting by firm size; and (3) labor informality is uncorrelated with the COVID-19 shock, and therefore does not affect targeting by sector.

I estimate optimal state transfers to local governments, examining how intergovernmental grants interact with local capital spending decisions and mitigate cross-jurisdictional externalities. Using variation in school facility grants, I provide evidence on transfer program design and derive implications for state policy toward municipal infrastructure and housing projects.

Using household-level data and a dynamic regression discontinuity design across state boundaries, I study how state-sponsored homeowners insurance plans affect housing values and household sorting in regions where private insurers exit due to escalating climate risk.